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Suitability of divestiture measeures in non-merger cases

Authors

Abstract

The article addresses divestiture measures in non-merger cases, highlighting their relevance in competition law. These measures, which have a significant impact on market structure, are less common in consultative and contentious procedures compared to their application in mergers, where they are typically used to mitigate horizontal risks. However, in exceptional cases, such as those involving abuse of dominant position or monopolization, they have been successfully applied. The article also emphasizes that the primary purpose of divestiture measures is to restore competition and prevent the recurrence of anti-competitive practices. The analysis includes a discussion of the legal nature of these measures, suggesting that, while they are not sanctions in the strict sense, they may acquire a punitive character in certain cases, especially when total divestitures are imposed, significantly limiting the property rights of the undertakings involved. In most cases, however, they are considered corrective or preventive measures, designed to restore competitive balance in markets affected by violations. The article concludes that the imposition of divestiture measures must be based on the principles of effectiveness and proportionality. It emphasizes the importance of evaluating whether less burdensome alternatives exist to achieve the same objectives without excessively harming the affected economic agents. Finally, this analysis should be more restrictive in cases where total disvestiture is sought.

Keywords:

antitrust, divestiture, structural remedies, proportionality, effectiveness

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