The purpose of this paper is to describe the practice of the Constitutional Court to invoke and / or follow, de facto, its own precedents. To describe this phenomenon, we distinguish simple and complex variants of this practice. Among the first, we examine judgments where tests, standards, parameters or judgments of constitutionality are invoked or enunciated; judgments that make own concepts or doctrinal categories developed in previous sentences of said Judiciary; and judgments that give account of the jurisprudential framework existing in a certain subject. From the perspective of complex variants, the work accounts for at least four modalities: judgments that explain the existence of a binding precedent; those that explain that there is an applicable precedent, but that it must be replaced; judgments in which the minority vote directly or indirectly questions the majority to deviate from the precedent that is considered binding and where we observe the more dense developments and justifications on the part of the TC; and cases in which a precedent seeks to update an earlier one, without substantively modifying it. Finally, the work offers an evaluation from the perspective of the institutional consequences of this practice and conclusions.
García García, J. F. (2018). Factual horizontal precedent in the Constitutional Court?. Revista De Derecho Público, 247–262. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5249.2018.51261
